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ABSTRACT
With the collapse of the Soviet threat, the Army is finding itself in a period of significant
change: changes in funding, size, focus and missions. To adapt to this change, the Army needs to
be more innovative. This thesis examines the subject of innovative change. It analyzes a case of
successful innovative change in the 101st Airborne Division's support structure.
Prior to and during Operation Desert Shield, the Division adopted the LAB/FOB support
concept that contributed significantly to the Division's success in Operation Desert Storm. The
analysis of this case shows how innovative change is brought about in an Army organization.
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States
Army is facing a period of almost unprecedented change. The
Army must change its focus from a war in Europe to responding
to unforeseen regional crises throughout the world. The Army
is also being given many new missions (peacekeeping, disaster
relief, humanitarian, drug interdicting, etc.), missions for
which it has very little experience, training or doctrine.
The Army is also experiencing significant reductions in size
and funding, so it will have to adapt to this new world order,
and its role in it, with less resources than it has had in the
past. In order to cope with these changes, the Army must be
innovative, finding new and better ways to do its traditional
mission as well as finding the best way to deal with its new
missions.
The Director of Net Assessment for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, A. W. Marshall, believes that we are
experiencing the early stage of major change in the nature of
warfare. He claims that we are on the verge of a military
revolution (Marshall, 1993). He compares this to the
military-technical revolution that occurred in the 1920s and
'30s. Then the development of technologies like the airplane,
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the aircraft carrier, and the tank revolutionized warfare.
These technologies led to changes in concepts of operations,
in military organizations, and in the character of warfare
itself. He believes that this emerging military revolution
will not be the result of technology but the result of
innovation, finding new, better, innovative ways to use
existing technology to change the nature of warfare. He warns
that if the next couple of decades are to be a period of
innovation, it will require.top-level support to more junior
innovators and innovations.
To be prepared for this emerging military revolution and
to cope with the changes currently at hand, Army leadership
will have to understand innovative change, the factors
affecting it, and how it is brought about in an Army
organization.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to provide the reader with
an understanding of how innovative change can be brought about
in an Army organization. We will explore the factors
affecting innovative change and the methods to be used to
bring it about. We will also present a case of successful
innovative change in an Army organization. It is our intent
that this understanding of innovative change will assist the
reader in bringing it about or support others who attempt it




"• How is innovative change brought about in a conservative,
traditional organization like the United States Army?
2. Secondary
"* What is innovation? Who is the innovator or entrepreneur?
"* What are the basic elements required to bring about
change?
"* How is resistance to change overcome?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis is not an exhaustive analysis of change. It
focuses on one particular case of change. The analysis
concentrates on concepts pertinent to the case study and not
on all concepts valuable to understanding and managing change.
The case study is an historical account of what occurred
in the 101st Airborne Division prior to and during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It is limited to the extent
that we were unable to contact all principals. Only four of
the seven principals involved could be located and agreed to
interviews.
In order to maintain a focus on the aspects of successful
innovative change, this paper is 'de-personalized' except for
the entrepreneur. The focus is on the change itself, for good
or bad, and how this particular entrepreneur successfully
developed and implemented change in his organization. Exactly
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who supported the entrepreneur and whether or not the change
was absolutely essential for the organization are less
significant to the theme of this thesis. The objective of our
analysis is to provide the reader with an extensive
understanding of the aspects of innovative change and to equip
him or her with the tools necessary to develop and implement
innovative ideas in a military environment.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Several references were reviewed to help us understand the
change process. Of these references, we selected aspects that
best analyze innovative change in organizations such as the
101st Airborne Division, which is the organization undergoing
change in our case study.
We conducted several interviews with principals involved
in the combat service support doctrinal change in the 101st
Airborne Division. Generally, each principal was given the
same interview questions. Interviews were conducted by
recorded telephone conversations, which were later
transcribed, or by questionnaire.
We conducted research on the historical events of the
Division's activities in Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. This information came from "Lessons Learned" documents
of the Division and the XVIIIth Airborne Corps and from
articles published in professional publications such as The
Military Review. We also reviewed the development of the
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LAB/FOB concept in the Division's historical documents
(standard operating procedures, battle notes, doctrinal
publications).
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following acronyms and definitions are provided to
assist the reader.
* DISCOM: Division Support Command. This is a brigade
sized unit responsible for the combat service support
operations in the division. Elements of the command are
task organized to support the three infantry brigades in
the event of a deployment.
* DSA: Division Suppirt Area. This area is located in the
division rear area and is composed of the main support
companies of the DISCOM which are responsible for direct
support to the division.
* BSA: Brigade Support Area. This area is located in the
brigade area of operations and is composed of the forward
combat service support companies of the DISCOM which are
responsible for direct support to the brigade task force.
* LAB: Logistic Assault Base. This is a scaled down
version of the BSA. Its size depends on the mission of
the brigade. Generally, where the BSAs were composed of
the same structure of personnel and equipment, LABs were
tailored packages that were very mobile.
* FOB: Forward Operating Base. This is an ad hoc organi-
zation composed of elements of the forward support
companies not required in the LABs and of selected
personnel and equipment from the DSA. The FOB was
strategically located between the DSA and the LABs in
order to provide immediate resupply of high demand items
to the LABs and to be an intermediate distribution point
for the division based on the availability of road
networks and airfields. The size and composition of the
FOB was tailored to the mission of the division and the
number of units it supported.
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G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
We will initially provide a review of literature that
pertains to change. Next, we will provide a case study
concerning change in the service support operations for the
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) that occurred just prior
to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This case study
is a particularly interesting subject for innovative change in
an organization. It involves an entrepreneur who possesses
the ingenuity, boldness, and resolve to attempt restructuring
long standing logistic operations in an organization with many
strong adversaries to change. This chapter will be followed
by an analysis of the case study. Finally, we will finish




A. INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Our thesis is about change. Since there are many
different types of change, it is important that we first
briefly discuss the different types of change to narrow our
focus.
Of the many types (natural, societal, political, personal,
and organizational), our case addresses organizational change.
An organization is defined as:
the rational coordination of the activities of a number of
people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose
or goal, through division of labor and function, and
through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility
(Nadler and Tushman, 1991, p. 544).
The organization is the 101st Airborne Division and the
question was how to change its combat service support
structure and operations.
Change within an organization may be regressive, going
back to the old way of doing business, or progressive, finding
new, bette• innovative ways of conducting operations. Change
can also be the result of decay. A system that fails to
actively manage its change may indeed change, but that change
will result in decay and obsolescence. It is innovative
change with which this thesis is concerned. Innovation is
defined as the process of bringing any new idea into use. New
7
ideas can be a product or service. They include ideas for
reorganizing, cutting costs, putting in a new budgeting
system, improving communications or assembling products in
teams. Innovation is the generation, acceptance and
implementation of new ideas or processes (Kanter, 1983, p.
20).
Innovative change can be first order or second order
change. First order innovative change is innovation that
occurs within a system while the system itself remains
essentially the same. Second order innovative change is a
change in the system itself (Watzlawick and others, 1974, p.
I0). First order change is characterized as normal,
incremental and evolutionary, while second order change is
characterized as radical, transformational, and revolutionary
(Levy, 1986, p. 10). This can be best explained with an
example. During its first one hundred years, the telephone
system in the United States went through many changes, but the
system itself remained essentially the same. All telephone
service was provided by one company, the Bell Telephone
Company. In essence, Bell Telephone was the system. All the
changes that occurred (growth, technological, improved service
and decreased reliance on operators) were all first order
changes. The system remained essentially the same with Bell
as the sole provider of telephone service. The breakup of
Bell Telephone in the late 1970s was a second order change.
The system itself changed. There are now many regional
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telephone systems and several corporations competing to
provide long distance telephone service.
Second order change is considered a higher level change.
It requires the system be viewed and introduced from a higher
level. The current telephone system could not have been
introduced from within the Bell Telephone System.
Innovative organizational change is usually led by the
organizational entrepreneur (sometimes referred to as the
intrapreneur because he operates from within the organization)
(Stoner and Freemen, 1989, p. 713). To understand how
innovative change is brought about, we must understand the
entreprene .. .-e entrepreneur's attitudes, beliefs, and
perceptions of the environment. How does the entrepreneur
overcome significant resistance to his innovation and how does
he obtain and use power to bring about change?
1. The Entrepreneur/Innovator
According to J.B. Say, the French economist who coined
the teim around 1800, "the entrepreneur shifts economic
resources out of low areas and into areas of higher
productivity and greater yield." In other words, the
entrepreneur finds new ways to use resources to maximize
productivity and effectiveness (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p.
XIX). Although this definition covers what an entrepreneur
does, it does not explain who he is, his character, or how he
does it.
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Entrepreneurs are, above all, visionaries (Kanter,
1983, p. 239), - those people who are able to perceive
opportunities that others do not (Stoner and Freeman, 1989, p.
697), or see opportunities where others see only problems
(Stoner and Freeman, 1989, p. 697). Entrepreneurs see change
as the norm and as healthy. They always search for change,
respond to it and exploit it as an opportunity (Stoner and
Freeman, p. 698) . Entrepreneurs possess tremendous focus and
are able to remain steadfast in their vision, even when the
interests of others wane. Tom Peters states that they possess
energy, passion, idealism, pragmatism, cunning, towering
impatience and an unrealistic unwillingness to allow any
barrier to set them back (Peters, 1987, p. 301).
Entrepreneurs possess a tolerance for ambiguity
(Stoner and Freeman, p. 709). They tend to have a longer time
horizon than their counterparts. They show conviction for an
idea and have no need for immediate results (Kanter, 1983, p.
239). Because of this, they are less affected by the stress
induced by time pressures that influence much decision making.
The literature reveals some disagreement on another
characteristic of the entrepreneur. Some feel entrepreneurs
are risk takers, that they possess a "bold heart of risk"
(Marris, 1974, p. 119) and that organizations should select or
train risk takers (Kanter, 1983, p. 239) . Others believe that
entrepreneurs like to take risks but only reasonable ones
(Stoner and Freeman, 1989, p. 706). Still others stated that
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entrepreneurs have "one thing and only one thing in common,
they are not risk takers (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. XX).
We hope in our analysis to offer a possible explanation for
these differing viewpoints.
Entrepreneurs are also described as having "Type A"
behaviors, a "chronic, incessant struggle to achieve more and
more in less and less time, and if required, to do so against
the opposing efforts of other things or persons." They have
a need to achieve and feel that they have control over their
own lives and are not controlled by fate, luck or other
external forces (Stoner and Freeman, 1989, pp. 708-709).
We have reviewed the characteristics of an
entrepreneur. However, these characteristics alone do not
make someone an entrepreneur. What makes one an entrepreneur
is having an innovative idea and seeing it through the
entrepreneurial process to successful implementation.
The entrepreneurial process has three phases:
creation, design and implementation (Roberts, 1992, p. 58).
In the creation phase, the entrepreneur generates a new
innovative idea. This new idea may be totally original or it
may be borrowed or adapted from existing ideas that are only
new in the context in which they are applied.
In the design phase, the idea is transformed into
something more tangible. The idea is put on paper and a plan
is developed to translate the idea into an implementable
"prototype".
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The implementation phase starts with testing of the
idea as designed. Can it work? Does it need to be modified?
Can it get the needed support to succeed? Will it solve the
problem it was designed to solve, and will it be worth the
cost?
To be successful, the entrepreneur must act in many
different roles as he goes through the entrepreneurial
process. First, in the idea phase, he must be an
intellectual, able to envision a new reality, to see beyond
the problem to a better way of doing things. Next he must be
an advocate who takes the basic idea through the design phase
and turns it into a tangible proposal. He needs to be the
idea champion who takes the proposal and gathers the support,
sets the frame and uses the power tools necessary to get the
proposal implemented and ensure its success. Last he must be
an administrator with the necessary leadership and
organizational skills needed to execute the approved proposal
(Roberts, 1992, pp. 60-62). One must be successful in each
role and must work the idea through each phase before he is
considered an entrepreneur.
2. Resistance
The most important factor in understanding how change
can be brought about is understanding resistance to change.
Why are humans so often resistant to change? We think Peter
Marris said it best when he said:
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We accept resistance to change as a fact of life. We
expect civil servants to be defensive when challenged by
innovators or peasant farmers to react with suspicion to
new techniques. We know that children are easily upset by
disturbances in the routine of life, and take it for
granted that to lose someone you love is deeply
distressing. But why? Humans are also the most adaptable
of all living creatures - they survive in an extreme
variety of social and physical environments. They go
through great changes in the course of the most
commonplace careers. We scarcely ever live two days
exactly alike. In the face of drastic disruption - wars,
earthquake, enslavement - the survivors somehow pull
themselves together and go on. Why then should we think
conservatism natural, and what is its nature? (Marris,
1974, p. 5)
Each of us has our own perception of reality, "a
meaningful pattern of relationships," (Marris, 1974, p. 1) a
set of assumptions, understanding and experiences that we use
to give meaning to the world around us. We use this
perception to bring predictability and continuity to our
lives. It is perhaps easiest to illustrate this with an
example. Consider your next day at work. Even though you
have not experienced it yet, you know basically what time you
will arrive, what you will do, with whom you will interact and
how that interaction will be characterized - friendly, formal
or adversarial. We base this perception of our next day at
work on our past experiences and on a belief that the world is
predictable and events have continuity. We can expand this to
every aspect of our lives.
We have a basic perception, that pattern of
relationships with which we give meaning to everything in our
environment. This perception is very important to us. It is
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the basis for all our actions and interactions. It enables us
to ,predict our own behavior and the behavior of others"
(Marris, 1974, p. 10). Without this perception, these basic
assumptions of the world would be a series of random,
discontinuous events without meaning in which we could not
survive. Because our basic assumptions are so important to
our survival, to our ability to cope with our environment, we
tend to defend it vehemently, even ignoring facts that are
incompatible with our scheme of things (Marris, 1974, pp. 8-
9).
If these assumptions are so important and we defend
them so vehemently, how then is it possible for us to adapt,
to make sense of new experiences? We do so by assimilating
the new experiences into our perception, we relate the new
experiences to what we already know, we "make the unfamiliar
familiar, to reduce the new to the old" (Marris, 1974, p. 9).
We create a metaphor from what we know to explain what is new
and unfamiliar (Pondy and others, 1988, p. 17).
We adapt and change incrementally over time, each
increment within the limits of what can be assimilated into
our basic assumptions. This, however, does not always work.
Some new experiences cannot always be assimilated,
contradicting facts cannot be ignored or explained away. When
these experiences occur, they cause us to doubt or lose faith
in our basic assumptions and create in us a feeling of
ambivalence. Examples of experiences in the business world
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that could cause this feeling are loss of profits or market
share, rising costs or a new technology. These may cause a
company to lose faith in its basic assumptions about how it
does its business, its product marketing, method of production
or its overall strategy. This feeling of ambivalence makes us
first try to restore our lost faith in our basic assumptions,
and when that proves impossible, then and only then are we
receptive to innovative change. Through the innovation we
hope to forge a new set of basic assumptions that enable us to
restore the continuity and predictability of the worli around
US.
This ambivalence is similar to the experience of
bereavement that occurs with the death of a loved one. Those
intimately involved with death are faced with a radical
disruption of their pattern of relationships (Marris, 1974,
pp. 23-24). They first try to regain their pattern of
relationships by continuing as if the death had not occurred.
Once they realize that this is not possible and they have come
to terms with the death, they then seek to develop a new
pattern of relationships so they can go on with their lives.
The reason this is so important in order to understand
innovative change is because unless the group on which the
innovation is dependent has reason to doubt their basic
assumptions, the innovation is doomed to failure. Consider
the issue of gays in the military. The basic assumption
within the military is that homosexual behavior is contrary to
15
the good morale and discipline of the military and therefore,
cannot be tolerated. Although President Clinton clearly had
the authority to impose change upon the military, by directing
that gays be allowed in the military, he was unable to make
the change. He was unable to make the change because the
military had no reason to doubt its basic assumption. He was
forced to accept a compromise that fit the military's basic
assumption, gays can serve but homosexual behavior is still
considered contrary to the good morale and discipline of the
military, and engaging in it will result in discharge. It is
not our intention here to over-simplify a very complicated
issue, nor is it our intention to justify or explain the
military's assumption on gays. Our intention is only to
illustrate that the strength of the military's assumptions is
one explanation for their resistance.
This process of rejecting old assumptions and
accepting new ones affects people differently. Although most
will need time to register shock, denial, grief and mourning
(Pondy and others, 1988, p. 197), the period in which this
happens will differ. The innovators or entrepreneurs (as in
our case) may have already rejected the old assumptions and be
convinced that their innovation is the way to establish a new,
secure set of assumptions, while others are just starting to
doubt their old assumptions. Some innovators consider the
opposition to their innovation as ignorance or prejudice. The
innovator has already worked out an integration of new
16
assumptions, perhaps through months or even years of analysis
but they deny others the chance to do the same (Marris, 1974,
p. 155). By doing so they are likely to entrench the
opposition and doom their innovation to failure.
To be successful, innovators must be aware of this
conflict between old and new that occurs in everyone, and that
no one can resolve this conflict for another anymore than
friends can tell the bereaved how to make the "best of it."
There are however, ways to assist others through this process.
First is through open communication. The innovator should
explain to others exactly how he came to the realizations he
has and how he worked out the conflicts for himself. He can
present arguments that cause others to begin to doubt their
assumptions. He should also allow others to openly express
their opposition and reservations so he can help them along.
Second the innovator should, if possible, get everyone
effected involved early. As Tom Peters said, "involve
everyone in everything" (Peters, 1987, p. 343) . This way
everyone will go through the process together and hopefully
make the same realizations at the same time.
Without some doubt in basic assumptions and the
ambivalence that comes with it, people will resist all
attempts at change. However, we have all been involved in
situations or know people who were involved in situations
where everyone knew (and clearly expressed) that the way
things were being done were not the best way to be done. Yet
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often in these situations, people are still resistant to
change. There are many stories in the Army of soldiers living
in miserable conditions resisting movement to new locations.
This resistance comes from fear and insecurity -- the
fear and insecurity that come from change. Our current
situation may not be good, but it is familiar, and we know
where we fit in - "My foxhole may be cold, wet and close to
enemy fire but it's mine!" With change, the situation may get
better, or it may get worse. Where will we fit in once in the
new situation. The new foxhole may be colder, wetter and
closer. People fear that change will jeopardize their job
security, that they may not be needed after the change, or
that they may not possess the skills required to carry out new
tasks (Tichy, 1983, p. 344).
Fear also prevents people from attempting innovation.
Every organization has people with innovative ideas, but often
they fail to act because of the risk involved. What will
happen if their idea should fail? Will it threaten their
current position and employment or their future with the
organization? This is certainly true in the Army. We all
know of many instances where people had great ideas but when
asked to give their idea a try, they are unwilling to do so
because of the risk. The Army's performance evaluation system
fosters this fear of risk. Performance evaluations are based
on the achievement of stated objectives with no consideration
of risks taken or effort applied. This leads to an
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incremental approach to problem solving, concentrating on
short term attainable objectives which will not be difficult
to achieve or pose any risk to either the worker or the
manager (Richards and Cloutier, 1993, pp. 19-23) . Dr. Deming
states that this type of performance evaluation based on
objectives is management by fear, and it encourages short term
performance at the expense of long term planning. It
discourages risk taking, builds fear and undermines teamwork.
He adds that these evaluations leave people "bitter,
despondent, dejected, some even depressed and all unfit for
work for weeks after the receipt of the rating" (Walton, 1986,
p. 91).
In order to overcome the resistance resulting from
fear, we must eliminate fear from the organization. One of
Dr. Deming's fourteen points of management is "drive out
fear." He states that "it is unbelievable what happens when
you let loose fear" (Walton, 1986, p. 73). To do this,
security must be provided for members of the organization.
People must know that regardless of changes and the success or
failure of innovations, their position and future in the
organization is secure (Peters, 1987, p. 416) . President
Clinton recently said that one thing he learned in his first
six months as President was that "to get people to really
change you have to create conditions in which they feel
secure" (TIME, 27 Sept. 93, p. 57). Change must become the
norm within the organization, part of the member's basic
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assumptions. Members should be evaluated not on meeting
objectives but on their love of change (Peters, 1987, pp. 560-
561) . People must be rewarded for the level of risk they are
willing to take, not for playing it safe.
The innovator can only reduce fear in people over whom
he has control (his sujordinates). There is very little he
can do to reduce the fear in his boss and in the many external
stakeholders who will influence the success or failure of his
innovation. There may be influential individuals who do not
share the same basic assumptions, those who will take longer
to reject their basic assumptions, and those who may never
doubt their assumptions. We all know at least one person who
insists that something was a dumb idea and should never have
been tried years after it has been successfully implemented.
There are still those who question women's current role in the
military even though women have proven their ability to serve
with distinction in both peacetime and war. Still others may
be ambivalent about their basic assumptions but will not be
convinced that the proposed innovation is the solution to
their ambivalence.
If what we have said up to now is true, then these
individuals will be resistant to change and oppose the
proposed innovation. How can we overcome or counter this
opposition? We do so through the use of power. Power, in the
sense that we intend it here, is "the potential ability to
influence behavior to change the course of events, to overcome
20
resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not
otherwise do" (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 30). The way in which power
is used in organizations is through politics and influence.
By politics we do not mean the negative backroom dealing, but
the "campaigning, lobbying, bargaining, negotiating,
caucusing, collaborating and winning votes" which is necessary
if an idea is to be sold (Kanter, 1983, p. 216).
There are many different sources and uses of power.
Entire volumes have been written on the subject, but for the
sake of clarity and brevity, we will only discuss the sources
and uses of power pertinent to our case.
In order to be successful, the innovator must be able
to build a coalition of supporters or allies to his cause. He
must be able to get others to buy in or sign on to his project
(Kanter, 1983, p. 221). Allies are important because it is
almost impossible to bring about any innovation alone. The
innovator will need resources controlled by others or may
require reaching into others' power base. Supporters may also
have influence over others whose support the innovator cannot
get, but whose cooperation he needs (Kanter, 1983, p. 216).
Supporters may be acquired in several ways. Support
may be based on personal relationships built up over years.
It may be based on horse trades or promises, "If I get your
support on this, I will support you on that" (Kanter, 1983, p.
224) Some will lend their support because they agree or have
been convinced that this is the best way to go. Support from
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top management is also essential because the endorsement or
attention paid by top management may convince others to join
in (Kanter, 1983, p. 226).
Another important aspect in getting support is how
something is framed and packaged. Framing is determining or
changing the context in which something is viewed and
discussed (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 203). Perhaps the best way to
explain this is with an illustration. An Army maintenance
officer wants to get a new maintenance facility built for his
organization. The current one is old, drafty, not well heated
or lit and none of the equipment works well. He is convinced
that this is affecting his units' productivity. He presents
a well prepared proposal for a new facility with careful cost
benefit analysis showing how the new facility will improve
productivity, save money and improve customer service. His
proposal is rejected -- no funding is available. The same day
his proposal is rejected he gets a memo stating the Army's
interest in quality of life issues and requesting proposals to
improve quality of life. He resubmits his proposal stating
how the new facility will improve quality of life and mentions
increased productivity as an added benefit. Viewed in this
new frame, the proposal is approved.
Another example of framing is presenting something as
a proposal or a done deal. If the innovator asks whether we
should do something as opposed to stating we are going to do
something he will get a much different response. In the
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former he is likely to be presented with problems, whereas in
the latter, he is likely to get solutions along with the
problems (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 204).
Along the same lines as framing is the proposal's
packaging, can it be made salable? Is it trial-able? Can it
be demonstrated in a trial before accepting or rejecting it?
Is it reversible? Can we easily go back to the way it was
done before if it fails? People who disagree with the
innovator are less likely to actively oppose him if the worst
that happens if it fails is things go back to the way they
were before (Kanter, 1983, p. 221).
Another source of power is a person's formal position
and reputation. Formal position gives the power to direct or
order things to be done. Although there are limits to this
(some of which we have discussed earlier), for the most part
"acceptance of hierarchy, of the chain of command, is so
automatic that it makes news when it is violated" (Pfeffer,
1992, p. 133). Formal position also gives others an
expectation of expertise. People are less likely to challenge
the financial officer on matters of finance or the engineer on
product design. Along with formal position, a person's
reputation is a source of power. A person wants to develop a
reputation as someone who is reliable and predictable, someone
who can make things happen, who has power and influence. "The
reputation for having power brings more power" (Pfeffer, 1992,
p. 136). If one is preconceived as powerful, he is less
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Slikely to be challenged. others will want to be associated
with him, and he will find it much easier to find allies and
supporters (Pfeffer, 1992, pp. 136-137).
Another important source of power is timing, being at
the right place at the right time. A well timed action may
succeed while the same action taken at the wrong time will
fail (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 227) . Asking Dad for a loan just
after he finished paying the bills is not a good idea. During
the military buildup in the 1980's, getting military
construction projects approved was relatively easy. Today
almost impossible. issues have a quality of "ripeness"
(Pfeffer, 1992, p. 244). Knowing when to act and when not to
act is- as important as the quality of the proposal.
As Sir Francis Bacon noted, "knowledge is power.,,
Information is probably the most important source of power.
To be successful, the innovator must begin collecting
information from the very beginning. He needs information to
clearly define the problem. Knowing the different issues and
viewpoints surrounding a proposal as well as what is hot and
what is not within the organization will enable the innovator
to put the proper frame on his proposal. He must seek
information on who are the potential supporters and opponents.
Who are the stakeholders? Which ones are important and which
are not? Acquiring more information than anyone else will
establish him as the technical expert. It will enable the
innovator to counter his opponents' arguments before they have
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a chance to formally present them. Information will win
support because it will show that the innovator has done his
homework, and those who are still opposed are less likely to
be able to mount an effective opposition (Kanter, 1983, pp.
218-220).
In this chapter we have studied the factors involved
in overcoming resistance in order to get an organization to
accept change. We have also discussed the characteristics and
actions of the entrepreneur. In the next chapter we will
present a case of innovative change that occurred in the U.S.
Army. We will then compare what we have studied here with the
case to see if we can gain any insight into how change can be





In September 1990, in the unfinished construction of
King Fahd International Airport just west of Dhahran in Saudi
Arabia, Colonel Stuart W. Gerald, commander of the Division
Support Command (DISCOM) for the 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault), faced making a decision on an issue equally as hot
as the suffocating heat of the desert sun. The issue
concerned whether or not the DISCOM should change its support
doctrine or retain its current support methods. The major
unit commanders within the Division had strong convictions on
both sides of the issue, splitting the leadership into three
groups. Some of the leaders endorsed Colonel Gerald's
preference for change, others held strong convictions to the
contrary, and the remainder appeared to be completely neutral
on the issue.
Colonel Gerald expected that changes in DISCOM's
support doctrine would precipitate a great deal of debate. It
was difficult to predict how the chain of command above the
Division would view a change in the unit's routine support
procedures prior to a conflict with the fourth largest
military force in the world. There was equal uncertainty
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concerning the reaction of DISCOM's subordinate commanders and
soldiers who were trained in the established procedures that
they had practiced for years in preparation for ýa :cnflict
like the one they were currently facing. It would be
reasonable for them to question whether there was enough time
to train for a new support concept before a ground war was
initiated. Did the soldiers within his command have the
ingenuity to smooth rough edges and make the new concept work
successfully on the battlefield? Could the Division
successfully execute its mission requirements under the
current support procedures? Colonel Gerald considered these
as well as many other questions in deciding whether or not to
implement the divisional service support concept he had been
developing since early in his command assignment. The
decision had to be made prior to entering a ground war with
Iraq. He did not have much time before he had to act.
a. Background
The 101st Airborne Division's air assault doctrine
was initially developed during and tailored for the Vietnam
War. The Army realized many benefits of the helicopter, a new
weapon during this era. Initially, the helicopter was used
for medical evacuation purposes and limited troop transport.
However, the mission of the helicopter expanded rapidly as the
Department of the Army poured money into the development and
acquisition of better aircraft. As the lift capacity
27
increased, the ability to transport troops and equipment
improved. As a result, the helicopter was no longer limited
to emergency resupply and small unit transport (small
quantities and weight). Helicopters could now lift critical
combat equipment, supplies, and large units and deliver them
quickly to places that were not accessible by ground movement.
Terrain was no longer a limiting constraint. The main concern
now was the number of helicopters in the service.
Realizing this powerful capability, The Department
of the Army began plans for a new type of division. The
Division would be light in nature (similar to an airborne
division) and be allocated an aviation brigade with more
helicopters than any other division. The mission for the
Division was to be capable of moving anywhere on the
battlefield quickly with significant fire power. The Division
which assumed this mission was the 101st Airborne Division.
The success and lethality of this division during the Vietnam
War awarded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) with the
permanent mission of air assault doctrine.
Many configuration changes for the Division
occurred in the decades following the Vietnam conflict. The
predominant concern for the Army was preparation for a full-
scale battle on the European continent opposing the Soviet
threat. Terrain was no longer the dense jungle of Southeast
Asia, but the rolling European farmlands which favored tank
and mechanized battles. The Soviet tanks strongly outnumbered
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the tanks in the Allied inventory. This type of warfare
negated the value of air assault doctrine developed in the
Vietnam War. The predominant mission of the helicopter
centered on a tank killing platform while light, highly mobile
forces became less a focal point. The combat forces within
the Division remained relatively light but the logistical
support tail in the forward brigades and in the Division rear
continued to grow in order to support forecasts of enormous
consumption rates and destruction of supplies and equipment
that would occur in an all out battle with the soviets on
European soil. As a result, the DISCOM, a brigade size unit
with the mission of providing logistic support to the
Division, accumulated more equipment to efficiently handle the
increased number of supplies the European contingency mission
required. As a result, the 101st Airborne Division 'gained
weight.'
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
forming of a unified Germany, the mission of the United States
military forces evolved to a continental United States (CONUS)
based force capable of force projection, deploying to any
location worldwide on any type mission. The emphasis changed
to an economical, well-rounded force with many capabilities
(including air assault capability). The 101st Airborne
Division's specific competency of air assault operations
assured the Division's survival in an era of force reductions.
The immediate threats to the nation's interests were well
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suited for highly mobile, light forces. The divisions who
could deploy quickly and economically to any theater of
operations with sufficient force to overwhelm the enemy would
be the divisions selected for future missions. Selection for
these operations further reduced a division's risk of
deactivation in the government's force reduction plan.
b. March 1990
In the late afternoon in the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault) Conference Room, the Commanding General
(CG) for the Division, expressed a strong concern about the
Division's ability to conduct air assault operations. The
Division was considered for deployment to the operations
conducted in Grenada and Panama but was most probably not
selected due to the sortie requirement to move the Division.
Although the Division carried significantly more firepower
than the 82nd Airborne Division, the cost in time and money to
deploy the 101st Airborne Division made the 82nd a more
appealing force for deployment. There was also significant
skepticism both within the Division and in the higher echelons
of command that the 101st could not attain its mission
requirement of mobilizing within 18 hours due to the large
quantities of equipment organic to the Division. The CG
challenged his commanders to lighten their units or face
future overlooks, force structure cuts, or possible mission
failure if called upon to deploy.
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Shortly after the meeting, Colonel Gerald sat down
with the First Brigade Commander in the Officer's Club to
discuss a recent exercise the brigade conducted at the Joint
Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Shaking
his head, the Brigade Commander expressed the problem that
plagued him throughout the exercise. "I couldn't maintain an
offensive effort. Each time I moved firepower to the front,
the OPFOR (opposing force) attacked the BSA (Brigade Support
Area) and forced me to pull my offensive capability back to
the rear so I didn't lose my logistic line of support. Being
forced to play on the defense, the exercise developed into a
war of attrition which I couldn't win.":
Colonel Gerald understood the problem much more
than the First Brigade Commander realized. Since his
assignment to the 101st Airborne Division as the DISCOM
commander, the size and weight of the support tail throughout
the Division troubled him. Colonel Gerald used this
opportunity to gain an ally in support of an idea he was
confident would significantly improve the Division's ability
to conduct air assault operations. "As it stands right now,
the tail is wagging the dog. Suppose I reconfigured the
Division's support doctrine so that you didn't have such a
large burden for rear area defense? I have an idea that could
The quoted dialogues in this case study are fictional
statements, unless otherwise footnoted, that are based on
actual events or statements from interviews conducted in
support of this thesis.
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cut your CSS elements in the BSA by more than 50% without
degrading the quality of support you currently receive. This
will enable you to move on the battlefield without dragging a
huge support tail and it will definitely reduce your burden of
rear area security so that you can establish and maintain
offensive momentum."
The First Brigade Commander was immediately
skeptical of the idea. He was not sure if he liked the idea
of losing men and equipment normally under his control in
combat. His experience has usually supported the more-the-
better philosophy as applied to combat power. This plan
reached deep into his area of control. However, current
tactics were not working well as was evident in the thrashing
he received at JRTC and Colonel Gerald's idea supported the
CG's directive to lighten the force. He had used up all his
ideas, and he was ready to try just about any new suggestion.
With an ally in his corner, Colonel Gerald
believed he had the backing he needed to approach the Division
Commander with his concept. Colonel Gerald could rely on the
First Brigade Commander to endorse the idea. The next step
was to gain approval to test the concept now that he had the
brigade needed to test it on.
C. The White House
Among the first sites visitors see when entering
Fort Campbell, Kentucky, home the 101st Airborne Division (Air
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Assault), is the white, World War II vintage building which
houses the Division Headquarters. Inside the immaculately
polished antique building, on another hot and humid late
spring day, Colonel Gerald informally presented his idea to
the commanding general. The CG held his DISCOM commander in
high regard. His rich background stemming back before the
Vietnam Conflict in aviation and logistics operations made
"Stew" Gerald the choice pick for the DISCOM command in an air
assault division. Most of Colonel Gerald's suggestions were
approved with very little prodding required. However, this
current proposal concerned delicate nitters that could
significantly ruffle the feathers of his infantry brigade
commanders and some of his primary division staff members.
In his normal, laid-back but to the point fashion,
Colonel Gerald presented the benefits of scaling down the
forward deployed DISCOM elements in the infantry brigades.
There will not be a sufticient network to sustain the
Division in a bare base environment. We need to sustain
the brigade task forces the way we used to support
outposts in Vietnam (the CG served there as well). In-
stead of tacking a huge logistical tail on the brigade, we
need to lighten the tail, break down and configure the
supplies into unit packages in the DSA (Division Support
Area), and deliver the supplies directly to the combat
units on the ground. We should be flying the supplies
right over the BSA, directly to the troops. We've
certainly got enough aircraft in the Division to do it.
Besides, you've seen what a monster the BSA is. The
brigade commanders should be able to focus on fighting the
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battle without having to look over their shoulder[s] and
drag the BSA along.-
His unemotional and even temperament belied the intensity he
held inside. A few of his subordinates learned the difficult
way that this laid back demeanor tolerated nothing less than
good order, discipline, and 100 percent effort by everyone.
The benefits of lightening the brigades strongly
appealed to the CG. He was willing to take-on the hazards of
just-in-time inventory procedures if Colonel Gerald said he
could manage this risky process in a wartime environment.
However, he was not confident that his infantry brigade
ccmmanders would hold losing a large portion of their commands
in high regard (see Appendix A). He knew that without the
backing and total effort of the commanders, the initiative did
not stand a chance, no matter how sound the concept.
The CG's reply was exactly what Colonel Gerald
hoped for. "If you can convince one of the brigade commanders
to give this concept an honest effort and it passes a
challenging test, then we will stand a better chance of
convincing any adversary to this initiative that the change is
mutually beneficial to the killers and the logisticians.
Without a consensus among the brigade commanders and the
-A quote from the best recollection of CPT Frank Varnado,
the support operations Officer on Colonel Gerald's brigade
staff. Quote taken from an analysis paper, Entrepreneurial
Leadership, Frank Varnado, July 24, 1992, p. 4.
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division staff, this initiative could hurt us more than help
us. "
With those directives, Colonel Gerald and Colonel
Hill began plans to conduct an exercise to test the idea.
d. Golden Eagle 90
On a typically hot and humid June day in the
training areas of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the skies were busy
with helicopters of every type. There was a noticeable
difference in the aerial traffic. Usually the sky was
cluttered with helicopters on the first day of an exercise as
units were deploying to their training areas. On this
particular exercise, the traffic remained at a high
operational tempo everyday. Another noticeable difference was
that the lift helicopters were moving significantly more
logistic supplies than normal. Normally, due to the limited
resource of lift aircraft, most helicopters were committed to
troop and combat equipment displacement. Aircraft moving
logistics (commonly referred to as logbirds) were either a
result of the rare occasion of an idle lift helicopter or
hours of determined staff work to schedule aerial movement of
supplies. The combat elements always had precedence to this
valuable resource. This exercise, Golden Eagle 90, was
different.
The helicopters converged regularly to a large
open field. Like busy ants, soldiers moved supplies on and
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off the field. In the distance, a large rapid refuel point
(RRP) was busy with a torrent of helicopters. Soldiers
dripping with sweat crawled over supplies tactically arranged
in the field for movement to forward deployed units or were
opening cargo nets as forklifts moved supplies within the
concealment of the forest line. On the edge of the forest,
Colonel Gerald spoke with the CG.
Colonel Gerald explained the good and bad points
being revealed during the test. Many areas needed a lot of
work in order to make the new system of support work as well
as Colonel Gerald expected. Although it was the first time
DISCOM and First Brigade used the system, his concept was
performing well. Most importantly, the Division Commander
seemed to be favoring the new concept more each day. However,
he still was not prepared to etch the system in stone and
bless it as division doctrine. There was still too much
opposition to the idea within the Division. There was no
apparent reason to rush the concept development. The Division
commander felt there was time for Colonel Gerald to prove the
efficiency of the system and sell it to the plan's
adversaries. He strongly preferred selling the plan above
forcing it on the rest of the Division.
e. The New Support System
Colonel Gerald designed the new support concept to
be a flexible and efficient method of conducting logistics
36
support for an air assault division, It incorporated many of
the successful procedures developed during the Vietnam
conflict using aerial supply operations and made use of many
new ideas developed by the Division to provide light yet
robust support. The operational support concept was not
without risk. It emphasized just-in-time inventory
procedures. As a result, accurate and timely reporting of the
logistical status and operational requirements by the
supported units (a weak point realized during Golden Eagle 90)
was essential for success. The supporting units had to be
capable of reacting to emergency resupply as well.
The existing divisional support doctrine the
Division had been practicing for years incorporated two major
divisional logistic operating bases. The bulk of the supplies
(food, water, fuel, repair parts, etc.) and services
(maintenance, graves registration, laundry and bath, etc.) are
located in the division rear area at the Division Support Area
(DSA). High demand items and services are maintained in
limited quantities at the BSA located in the brigade rear area
(Status quo, Figure 1). Throughput from corps elements to the
BSA is used when possible, most significantly in the supply
classes of petroleum and water. Approximately three days of
supply are maintained in the BSA because the DSA is typically
a significant distance away. The main support companies
located in the DSA push stocks forward to the BSAs and provide















Figure 1: Concept Contrast
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Division rear area. Because of the "double" mission, the DSA
is only semi-flexible to react to emergency resupply
situations for the BSAs. As a result of this semi-flexibility
and the "more-is-better" attitude developed during the Cold
War, the BSAs are large support areas capable of sustaining
the brigade for several days.
The new support plan incorporated three divisional
logistic operating bases (LAB/FOB, Figure 1). The DSA
maintains the double mission of providing direct support to
divisional elements located in the division rear area, but
instead of pushing supplies to the BSAs, it pushes supplies to
a forward operating base (FOB). The number of FOBs employed
by the Division depends on the displacement of the brigades,
terrain, and tactical situation. Throughput to the brigades
and subordinate units is conducted when the situation allows.
The FOB maintains stockage of high demand items
and contains high demand services doctrinally maintained in
the BSA. The FOB is an ad hoc organization made up of
personnel and equipment not absolutely required by the support
elements in the DSA or forward in the brigades. The base is
controlled by a lieutenant colonel from DISCOM staff or a
DISCOM battalion commander. The ad hoc companies are
similarly controlled by captains on DISCOM staff. The FOB is
located in or very close to the supported brigade rear areas
so that it maintains a close relationship with its supported
elements and is able to react to emergency resupply operations
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if a supported brigade should run out of a high demand
commodity. The FOB's primary mission is to be responsive to
the supported brigades' requirements so that just-in-time
inventory procedures are successful. Furthermore, the concept
emphasized distributing supplies to the units as opposed to
burdening the units with the requirement to use their limited
transportation assets to pick up their supplies from the
distribution points. Due to the proximity of the FOB to the
supported brigades, more frequent deliveries of small lots can
be used to further reduce inventories in the BSAs. Loads of
every type commodity were broken down to 2,000 pounds each.
This procedure reduced setup time required to prepare loads
for each type aircraft. The smallest lift helicopter could
only lift 2,000 pounds. Using this standardizing method
simplified aircraft scheduling procedures and increased
inventory movement within theý Division. Aircraft schedulers
were notified of the number of loads required to be moved.
What type of aircraft and number depended on what was
available. Larger loads only restrict what type aircraft
could perform the mission, resulting in lighter lift airframes
sitting idle.
Due to lower inventories and better back-up
support from the FOB, the BSAs were able to scale down in size
significantly. The new concept did not require stan•dardized
structures of the forward support companies in the brigade
support areas. The structure of equipment and personnel were
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tailored to the supported brigade's specific composition and
mission. The BSAs throughout the Division shrunk down to less
than 50% their original size. As a result, the Division
Commander named them Logistic Assault Bases (LABs), hence the
initiative was named the LAB/FOB concept. Development of the
LAB/FOB concept advanced smoothly, however the biggest
challenge to Colonel Gerald's implementation efforts was yet
to raise its head.
f. Desert Shield
On August 2, 1993, Iraq invaded the small :ountry
of Kuwait, a valuable ally to the United States. A hostile
nation now controlled a large percentage of the most abundant
oil fields in the world and was in position to threaten the
most oil rich fields in Saudi Arabia. The implications of
these valuable resources in the wrong hands were far reaching.
The rest of the world immediately took action to return the
country back to the Kuwaiti people. A coalition of nations
formed to provide the military muscle necessary to force Iraq
out of Kuwait. Leading the effort, the United States
mobilized its rapid deployment forces to be the first elements
of the coalition to stand in between Iraq's aggression and the
rest of the oil fields south of Kuwait in Saudi Arabia.
Within days, the Division received mobilization
orders for Saudi Arabia. By late August, the 101st Airborne
Division established a base in the unfinished construction of
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King Fahd International Airport (KFIA) in western Saudi Arabia
near the city of Dhahran. In the heritage of the 101st's
operating base in Vietnam, the base was named Camp Eagle II.
The initial mission for the Division was to
conduct covering force operations on the Iraq/Saudi Arabia
border. The Second Brigade was the first to establish
covering force positions in the north. Due to the extensive
distance between these positions and Camp Eagle II, where the
DSA was located, the Division established an FOB south of
Second Brigade just outside the small city of An Nu'ayriyah.
The FOB was named Bastoyne. Bastogne was selected as a
suitable location for an FOB because it was positioned near
major road networks, it had improved surfaces (abandoned
airstrip) for helicopter landing zones, and it was near the
Division's covering force area. Although Bastogne only
supported one brigade, it was an ideal opporturity for Colonel
Gerald to continue development of the new support concept. As
the other brigades moved north, the FOB proved to be extremely
flexible and capable to adjust to the increased demands. To
improve support quality, the Division established a second FOB
further east at an unimproved airstrip just west of an
abandoned village. This FOB was named Oasis. Oasis supported
First and Third Brigades in the east while Bastogne continued
to support Second Brigade.
In the pre-war environment, the support structure
appeared to be efficient and trustworthy. However, there was
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the important question whether the new support doctrine should
be implemented at this point in time. One of the brigade
commanders wrote a scathing letter to the CG stating that if
the LAB/FOB concept were adopted as the Division's support
plan during hostilities, soldier lives would be lost and the
Division would be doomed to failure.
At the lower echelons of command, within DISCOM,
doubt and opposition surfaced as well. Several company
commanders strongly disliked some elements of the new concept.
The company commanders were now in charge of approximately 40
to 50 percent of their soldiers but were answering to the
performance of 100 percent of the their soldiers. The FOB
required the commanders to send a significant percentage of
their soldiers and equipment to a staff officer (in temporary
command) in order to organize the FOBs. Soldier performance
and equipment maintenance remained the original company
commander's responsibility to a large extent. The company
commanders did not believe they could adequately supervise
these elements when they were not operating within their areas
of authority.
Many staff officers at battalion and brigade level
held strong convictions against the plan as well. Established
processes such as personnel reporting became extremely
difficult as personnel 'went to the winds.' Company
commanders shuffled their personnel around to suit their own
requirements. The staff company commanders at the FOB were
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frustrated because they had no disciplinary authority to
discipline the soldiers under their responsibility and had to
rely on the original company commander to initiate disci-
plinary proceedings. They also felt that the original company
commanders were 'dealing from the bottom of the deck' when
deciding which soldiers and equipment would be sent to support
FOB operations. Many more problems arose which required
battalion commander and DISCOM commander intervention to
resolve. However, the leading cause of adversity was never
resolved to the satisfaction of opponents to the new plan.
Too many commanders felt that the LAB/FOB concept moved too
much of their command to someone else's authority. They felt
that they lost too much power and autonomy.
There were also upsides in favor of getting the
plan approved and implemented. The Second and Third Brigade
Commanders changed command prior to a ground war with Iraq.
One of these commanders violently opposed the change and the
other would not openly commit himself to either side of the
debate. Prior to assuming command, the new commanders were
thoroughly briefed by the Division commander on the new
concept. Although the LAB/FOB concept was radically different
than the service support doctrine they were used to using,
they both had positive attitudes toward the change and viewed
it as a necessary conversion to take full advantage of the air
assault capabilities of the Division. The positive attitudes
of the newer brigade commanders coupled with the strong
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backing of the First Brigade Commander signifi:anttly
strengthened consensus for the change within the Division.
Colonel Gerald realized that there would be
opposition to the concept no matter how long and hard he
worked to resolve differences in opinions. He could only
minimize criticism to the plan, not abolish it. A decision
had to be made whether the Division would use the LAB/FOB
concept when hostilities escalated to a ground war. Colonel
Gerald had to decide whether he had the support he needed to
make the plan work and enough evidence proving thac the new
support plan was essential for the Division. The primary
criticism of the change was that it was being implemented on
the eve before battle. Yet he was sure that if current
divisional service support procedures remained, the Division's
mission was at great risk. He was confident that large BSAs
would prove to be too cumbersome to successfully execute
division sized air assault operations. The limited resource
of helicopters would be overscheduled moving soldiers and
equipment belonging to the BSAs and the logistics essential to
the operation would be backlogged waiting for available lift
assets. However, he also recognized that without a general
consensus within the Division and 100% effort to make it work,
the new plan also could fail. Successful implementation and
execution of these changes would require flexibility and
innovation from all the leaders in the chain of command and a




On 17 January 1991, the 101st Airborne Division
began movement from its covering force positions in northeast
Saudi Arabia and Camp Eagle II (KFIA) to the west to establish
a tactical assembly area, named TAA Campbell, just east of the
city of Rafha. The Division's maneuver was in preparation for
a bold and aggressive mission to be conducted by the Division
upon initiation of the ground war with Iraq. The mission of
the 101st Airborne Division was to establish an FOB (FOB
Cobra) approximately 90 miles into Iraq. FOB Cobra would be
the staging base for follow-on missions involving interdiction
of enemy movement along Highway 8, which would likely be
retreating Iraqi Republican Guard forces from Kuwait or
reinforcements from Baghdad. The Division's follow-on mission
was to assist in the western envelopment of Iraqi forces in
and around Kuwait. Though the payoff for the operation would
be impressive, the risk of an air assault 90 miles into enemy
territory followed by further missions extending the distance
in excess of 150 miles would be enormous. The DISCOM faced
the immense task of supporting the mission with lines of
supply that stretched to the breaking point. FOB Cobra would
receive only aerial replenishment until the ground lines of
communication reached the FOB approximately three days into
the ground war (G+3). This left the DISCOM with the
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challenging mission of developing a major logistics base with
limited and tenuous aeriai resupply.
First Brigade was assigned the task of conducting
the initial assault into Iraq and securing FOB Cobra. Once
Cobra was secured and DISCOM was prepared to suppcrt the
follow-on missions from that location, Second and Third
Brigades launched assaults from Cobra norrh to Highway 8 (see
Figure 2). In order to prepare for western envelopment
operations towards Kuwait, the Division established another
FOB (FOB Viper) in the 24th Infantry Division's northern
sector. Second Brigade successfully launched its assault from
this FOB into EA Thomas interdicting enemy movement on Highway
8 south of Third Brigade's area of operations (AO Eagle).
Before operations for western envelopment of the Iraqi forces
could be initiated, the President of the United States called
for a cease fire. The 101st Airborne Division successfully
denied enemy movement along Highway 8 and was prepared to
continue its rapid advancement towaids Basra. Thus ended the
Hundred Hour War.
b. After-Action Review
The LAB/FOB service support concept was a
resounding success. It withstood a test under the most
challenging conditions. Despite severe weather conditions,
and the requirement to supply three ravenous brigades engaged
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Figure 2: Desert Storm
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point, the new service suppoL.t concept proved To be efficient,
flexible, and fully capable. The Division Commander's
successor was equally impressed with the concept.
... the Division's DISCOM fought and won a terrific war
against time, distance, weather and friction to deliver
service support to the units already flying and fighting
deep, all the while readying for the great leap to Cobra.
For the logisticians, the campaign began on 14 February
and did not let up until well after the cease-fire.
Rarely had anyone in the DISCOM been able to train to
resupply forces at this scale and pace. The principles
were known, and the piece parts familiar, but it is one
thing to imagine a LAB or FOB and quite another to execute
one in combat. DISCOM prepared well for the first wartime
validation of the LAB and FOB concept. Thanks to a lot of
hard driven miles and many slingloads, the Division would
fly in to Cobra "full up," ready to carry out sustained,
successive air assault operations (Miller, 1993).
The challenging mission assigned to the Division
during Operation Desert Storm not only validated the
effectiveness of COL Gerald's plan, but also validated COL
Gerald's view that change was absolutely necessary. The Third
Brigade Commander generally summed up the opinion of the
leadership in the Division.
The change was very necessary. No doubt about. If
there's a better idea -- I don't know about it. The fact
is, we could not have achieved the operational reach that
we did if we had been encumbered by our old concept. It
just took entirely too many CH-47 sorties to get the
forward support companies in to establish a BSA. For deep
air assaults, the LAB is the only way to go (Third Brigade
Commander, 1993).
B. EPILOGUE
The success of the concept has etched LAB/FOB plan into
the support doctrine for the Division. Although the Divi-
sion's service support structure has undergone significant
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change since Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, the
LAB/FOB concept has remained the standard operational
procedure in supporting division operations.
The success of the principals who were proponents of the
change are equally impressive. COL Gerald is now referred to
as BG Gerald. The Commanding General of the Division now
wears four stars and is currently the Vice Chief of Staff for
the United States Army. The other proponents of the concept
are currently filling key positions in the Army and have
already been promoted to general or have been selected for
promotion and are waiting for orders. The principal
vehemently opposed to the change is no longer on active duty.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This thesis is primarily concerned about how change is
successfully implemented in a military organization. The case
study of the LAB/FOB service support doctrinal change in the
101st Airborne Division provides an example of successful
innovative change in the Army. In this Chapter, we will
analyze this case using the factors effecting change that were
presented in Chapter II.
A. THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS
The LAB/FOB service support doctrinal change was a first
order, innovative change for the 101st Airborne Division. It
is a first order change because although the innovation had a
dramatic affect on the Division, it occurred within the
division support system. The basic logistical support system
where the DISCOM provides support to the brigades and other
elements of the Division remained unchanged.
The LAB/FOB concept is an innovative change because it is
an original idea that is seen through to successful
implementation. Initially, COL Gerald created an idea of a
"light logistical footprint" supporting each brigade. At this
point, he had not developed the exact composition of each unit
or developed a detailed mission for each unit under the
concept. His initial concern was to reduce the size of the
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vulnerable and cumbersome BSAs by moving significant combat
service support from forward brigade control to division
control in the division rear area (behind the brigades). This
inexact idea was presented to the Commanding General in this
format. Once COL Gerald received approval to develop the
concept further, the idea transitioned to the design phase of
innovative change.
The design phase initiated with the DISCOM and First
Brigade staffs planning for the Golden Eagle exercise. The
DISCOM staff, under the guidance of COL Gerald, developed
detailed plans for exactly what the LAB and FOB would be and
what service support assets (personnel and equipment) would be
located in each location. The brigade staff refined
logistical planning and reporting procedures which were needed
in order to make the LAB/FOB concept work. By the time of the
exercise, the basic idea had been transformed into a clear and
tangible package ready to be implemented. The implementation
phase began with the testing of the concept during the
exercise.
During Desert Shield, COL Gerald established the LAB/FOB
concept as the way DISCOM would support the Division. The
plan was then implemented on the Division as a whole, not just
First Brigade. The success of the concept during Desert Storm
was the final validation needed to establish the concept as
the Division's permanent service support doctrine. COL
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Gerald's entrepreneurial skills were successful in moving the
innovation from creation to implementation.
COL Gerald's idea of using an intermediate logistic
operating base (the FOB) between the BSA and the DSA was not
original. According to one of the Brigade Commanders during
Desert Storm who had previously served as the Division G-3
(operations and training officer), the Division had
experimented several times with an FOB (Telephone Interview,
1993). The idea of light logistic bases in the brigades
(LABs) supplied almost exclusively by helicopter was adapted
from procedures used in Vietnam. What makes COL Gerald an
entrepreneurial agent is his ability to coordinate the
different concepts into a package that significantly increased
Lhe Division's ability to rapidly deploy and move quickly on
the battlefield and implement the plan.
1. The Entrepreneur/Innovator
COL Gerald is a patient leader who is receptive to new
ideas. Early in his command, he quickly established a
favorable environment for ingenuity. Many new innovations
were developed which significantly increased the DISCOM's
ability to do business. For example, in order to meet the
mission requirements for FOB Cobra during Desert Storm, a
large helicopter refuel point had to be established extremely
quickly. COL Gerald requested the Supply Battalion to search
for innovative ideas down to the lowest levels of leadership.
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At platoon level, the idea of slingloading 10,000 gallon fuel
bags filled with 3,000 gallons of multifuel, maximizing a
CH-47 helicopter's lift capacity, was suggested. During the
Cold War years, such a thought would have been outrageous and
most likely not suggested. However, COL Gerald and the supply
battalion commander were quick to test the idea. Standard
set-up procedures and system configurations would have
required significantly more time resulting in slower rotations
of helicopters to the FOB. Many more innovations were
developed in the DISCOM because of the tolerant environment
for ingenuity COL Gerald established.
Concerning the characteristic of risk taking, COL
Gerald stated that he did not feel he was taking any risk,
although many around him felt he was taking a significant
risk. We believe this differing perception of risk is because
entrepreneurs are visionaries. They know their idea will work
and they know they possess the energy, focus and determination
necessary to make it a reality. They clearly see an
opportunity while others are overwhelmed by problems and
adversity.
In this case, COL Gerald is clearly acting as an
e--repreneur. The LAB/FOB concept was his idea and he
personally saw it through to successful implementation. He
was the idea person. Although his idea was an adaptation of
the way the Division was supported in Vietnam, it was clearly
a wholly new idea in the current context. Next, he was the
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advocate. He changed his idea into a tangible proposal that
he could articulate and stakeholders could comprehend.
Throughout the case, he is the champion. He skillfully used
the necessary power tools to gather support and overcome
opposition. Lastly, he was the administrator who was able to
successfully implement his idea.
This analysis evaluated COL Gerald's entrepreneurial
characteristics on his accomplishments, our personal knowledge
of him and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator test. The Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test is a personality test based
on Jung's theory of psychological types. It illustrates the
different ways in which people focus their attention, take in
information, make decisions, and choice of lifestyles by
categorizing personality types (Hammer, 1992, p. 4) . This
test is a scientific method to gain some insight into the
character and actions of an individual.
COL Gerald has taken the MBTI test several times and
his test results reveal him to be a extraverted, sensing,
thinking, and perceptive person (categorized as ESTP).
Although this may not be the strongest entrepreneurial type,
it shows many strong entrepreneurial characteristics. People
of COL Gerald's type are adaptable realists who are good at
getting others to adapt as well. ESTP type personalities are
adept at easing tense situations and pulling conflicting
factions together. They are able to see the need of the
moment and quickly move to meet it. They are gifted problem
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solvers because they do not feel bound to follow standard
operating procedures or preferred methods. They see ways to
achieve a goal by using existing rules, systems or
circumstances in new ways rather than letting them be
roadblocks (Hammer, 1992, p. 18).
The Army should seek and support those individuals who
have the talent and skills necessary to take an idea from
creation through successful implementation. But in the event
that these people are few in number, it might be easier to
find individuals who possess the skills and are capable of
performing one or more of the roles in the entrepreneurial
process (intellectual, advocate, champion, and administrator).
Thus, the Army could rely on the entrepreneurial teams for
innovative change rather than count heavily on a single
individual to perform all the roles and functions of
entrepreneurship. This approach (collective entrepreneurship)
can produce the benefits of entrepreneurship without so much
reliance on a single individual (Roberts, 1992). The result
has the potential to increase the innovative and
entrepreneurial activity in the Army.
B. CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE
For almost half of this century, the threat posed by the
Soviet Union has been the focus of the United States' military
policy. This threat has been the predominant factor in
determining the size and composition of the U.S. military
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forces and the missions for those forces. Every member of the
Army understood the role of the Army was to contain Soviet
expansionism and, if necessary, to fight a ground war
primarily in Europe. In this environment, all U.S. military
training doctrine and equipment focused specifically on this
effort. The threat enabled the U.S. to develop a secure
pattern of relations with our allies and enemies alike. It
gave us a solid belief in our basic assumptions. Members of
the military clearly understood who they were and their
purpose. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have
lost the premise upon which their very identity is based.
Although few, if any, mourn the loss of the Soviet threat,
many mourn the loss of the secure pattern of relations and
basic assumptions that were developed in response to that
threat. The loss of the Soviet threat created doubt in what
the Army held as true. Since the return of the "Soviet
threat" in the near future is very unlikely, the Army must
seek out a new pattern of relations and redefine missions,
doctrine, and strategies for the future.
Thus, in this case, the Division Commander was concerned
about the Division's approach to how it was doing business as
early as March 1990. In his opinion the Division was not
selected to participate in the two major operations in the
1980s because it was too heavy. His directive to his
subordinate commanders to lighten their units underscores his
belief that the Division's operational procedures were
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inappropriate. The fact that the Division was not selected
for any of the recent military operations shows that perhaps
the Division's higher command echelons also lost faith in how
the Division was doing business.
C. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
COL Gerald and the First Brigade Commander also shared
this loss of faith. Due to his past experience in logistic
operations, COL Gerald placed little faith in the success of
the Division's combat service support procedures when he first
entered the command. The First Brigade Commander lost faith
after having his BSA repeatedly destroyed during JRTC
exercises. These losses and the resulting ambivalence made
the Division receptive to the change presented by COL Gerald.
COL Gerald dealt with resistance to change in several
ways. He used open communication to overcome resistance. He
explained his new idea in detail at every appropriate
opportunity, such as command meetings, so that all
stakeholders could better understand his idea and become
comfortable with it. He also included everyone in the
development of the idea, building a sense of stakeholder
ownership. COL Gerald was very receptive to new ideas and
innovations and encour- i everyone to endeavor to improve
upon his idea. He also allowed time for everyone to adapt to
the concept and did not try to 'push' his idea on others. By
allowing people time to get used to the idea and not trying to
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force it, he prevented many stakeholders entrenching
themselves in opposition.
Although we do not feel that fear was a significant factor
among the senior leadership of the Division, we know from our
personal experience with this case that featr was a factor
among the subordinate leaders and staff in the DISCOM (the
brigades and division staff). We also know from our personal
experience that fear of failure is a significant factor in
resistance to change in the Army. Fear not only causes people
to resist change proposed by others, but it also hinders
people from attempting innovative ideas of their own.
We agree with the literature that the Army's performance
evaluation system fosters this attitude of fear. As LTC
Richards urges in his article, Performance Appraisal and TOM,
the Army must change the evaluation system and begin to
evaluate people not only on their achievements but also on the
merit of their ideas and their willingness to try them. He
states the Army must "drive out fear" and create an attitude
which fosters a "love of change" if the Army is going to cope
with this period of almost unprecedented change. However, the
Army must do this with caution. Although failure is necessary
and has acceptable drawbacks in peacetime, failure in a
wartime environment usually has catastrophic and unacceptable
results. The Army must search for a balance between allowing
and supporting failure in peacetime, and selecting and
promoting those who will succeed in war.
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From viewing COL Gerald's command, it is clear Low he
dealt with eliminating fear in the DISCOM and promoted
innovativeness. Those officers who proved to be innovative
and adaptable to change were usually given key positions or
responsibilities within his command. COL Gerald did not
evaluate officers solely on results. He placed more emphasis
on an officer's ability to correct deficient areas and use
innovative approaches.
Whether or not he was aware of it, COL Gerald skillfully
used power to gain approval of the LAB/FOB concept. His first
move in gaining the necessary power to implement his
innovative idea was to win the approval of the most
influential power in the Division, the Commanding General.
Although a general consensus throughout the leadership in the
Division was essential for successful adoption of the concept
into standard operating doctrine, winning the approval of the
Commanding General was a pivotal move to gain significant
power and backing. Before presenting the idea to the
Commanding General, COL Gerald gained support for the concept
from the 1st Brigade Commander. With a willing brigade, the
Commanding General would be more receptive to the idea and COL
Gerald had the necessary vehicle he needed to try the concept
and show it could work.
COL Gerald was careful to frame and package his proposal
to take advantage of what was a paramount issue in the
Division at the time. When presenting the concept to the ist
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Brigade Commander, he framed the concept as a means to reduce
the size of the BSA which would make the brigade rear area
more defendable (the primary concern of the Brigade
Commander). When presenting the concept to the Division
Commander, he framed the concept as a method to lighten the
Division and make its combat elements significantly more
mobile (the Division Commander's top concern at the cime) . He
also used metaphors such as support to the division in the
Vietnam War to draw upon the common experience he and the
Commanding General shared. Framed in a favorable light, these
two influential stakeholders were quick to become advocates of
the new combat service support concept.
He packaged the innovation as both "trialable" and
reversible. The Ist Brigade Commander was willing to test the
concept with his brigade. The trial would not require
significant capital investment and reversing back to the old
support procedures would not be difficult. Opponents of the
change were less likely to actively oppose it because the
trial required no effort on their part. This condition
changed, however, once the Division deployed to Sauci Arabia.
Once in theater, COL Gerald implemented the concept into the
Division's support procedures in the name of further testing.
However, he had every intention of making it a permanent
change even in the event of a war with Iraq. This move
involved the other two brigades and division staff. It
required that they implement the innovative support procedures
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in their own brigades. As a result, opposition to the concept
significantly escalated. At this time, the concept had been
tested and proven viable with substantial benefits to the
Division over the old support pr-cedures. More importantly at
this point in time, COL Gerald had been able to gain enough
supporters to overcome opposition. Opponents of the concept
lacked the essential power to resist the change.
COL Gerald's formal position in the Division provided him
with considerable power. As the DISCOM commander, he
controlled the division service support assets that supported
the Division. In this capacity, he inherited the position as
the primary advisor to the Division Commander on logistic
matters. To augment this power, COL Gerald had earned a
reputation as a capable logistician with exceptional
leadership abilities. Expertise in logistic support crossed
with his aviation background qualified him as a capable expert
suited for the aviation intensiv challenges of logistic
support for the 101st Airborne Division. With this
reputation, few were willing or able to mount a credible
argument against "the expert."
Timing is another source of power that played a vital role
in the success of this innovation. If COL Gerald h-d tried to
change the division service support doctrine in the 1980s as
opposed to the turbulent environment of the 1990s, he would
likely have experienced failure. In t>-a 1980s, the Soviet
expansionism was the threat that U.S. military doctrine
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centered on opposing. Light, mobile BSAs were never
established as a prominent requirement. Heavy BSAs provided
the brigade commanders with significant autonomy in military
operations and the capability to absorb the tremendous demands
in material and equipment anticipated in a war in Europe. As
a result, this mode of thinking established the basic
assumptions of the leaders in the 101st Airborne Division,
assumptions they had no reason to doubt. But with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Commanding General's
directive to lighten the Division, the timing was appropriate
for this innovative change. The timing of the 1st Brigade
Commander's frustrating experience at JRTC also presented an
excellent opportunity for COL Gerald to win support for his
idea.
This analysis shows that our case is a good illustration
of how innovative change can be brought about in the Army. It
shows examples of the factors effecting change and resistance
to change. It also shows how an entrepreneur operates, how he
overcomes resistance to change and how he obtains and uses the
power necessary to bring about the change.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMOMNDATIONS
The Army currently finds itself in a period of
extraordinary change. If A.W. Marshall, Director of Net
Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, is correct and
we are on the verge of a military-innovation revolution, then
the next several decades will be ones of extraordinary change.
To successfully cope with this period of change, the Army is
going to have to be innovative. It is, therefore, important
that the Army leadership understand what innovative change is
and how it is brought about.
Our study has shown that innovative change is brought
about by an entrepreneur. An individual who has an original
idea and the skills necessary to turn the idea into a tangible
plan that can be sold and implemented. He also possesses the
skills to successfully implement the plan.
To be successful, the entrepreneur must overcome
resistance to his innovation. He must allow others the time
necessary to realize the need for innovation and to accept the
innovation being proposed. He must openly communicate his
ideas and allow other stakeholders to freely express their
concerns. He should "involve everyone in everything" so
everyone feels a part of, and comfortable with, the change.
He should eliminate fear and create a "love of change", an
atmosphere where change is the norm, and people expect and
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welcome change, an atmosphere where they are evaluated on
their innovative efforts and support of others' innovative
ideas.
The innovator must also be skilled at obtaining and using
power. The innovator needs to win the support of key
stakeholders and overcome possible opponents. Information is
a key source of power. It enables the innovator to have more
knowledge of the subject than anyone else and, therefore, be
perceived as the expert. Knowledge of what is important in
the organization at the time enables the innovator to properly
frame his proposal and also time its introduction.
Understanding what innovation is and the factors effecting
innovation should help the innovator be successful in his
attempts. Understanding the entrepreneur and what he does
will help the rest of us to identify entrepreneurial efforts
and lend our support to them.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
To be innovative, the Army should seek out and support
those individuals who possess the skills of the entrepreneur.
But as we stated earlier, in the event that those individuals
are few in number, the Army can increase entrepreneurial
activity by building entrepreneurial teams. Rather than
relying on a single individual, it is the team that possesses
the skills necessary to bring about innovative change. The
team would have an idea person, an individual with an original
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idea for an innovative change. He would pass the idea to an
advocate who has the skill to turn an idea into a tangible
plan which can be sold and implemented. An idea champion
would then use the politics and power necessary to gain
support and overcome the resistance in order to get the idea
implemented. The approved plan is then given to an
administrator who has the organizational and leadership skills
necessary to make the plan work.
The Army should also create an environment that fosters
innovative activity. The Army can go a long way toward that
goal by changing the current evaluation system. People should
be evaluated on their "love of change", on their willingness
to try innovative ideas and on their efforts, not on the
achievement of short sighted achievable goals.
B. FURTHER RESEARCH
In our research we discovered that one brigade commander
was vehemently opposed to the LAB/FOB concept and turned many
members in his command against it also. When a new commander
took charge who supported the change, he could not believe the
opposition he faced within his own command. How he dealt with
that opposition and how the opposition effected the brigade's
performance in the Gulf War may prove an interesting and
useful case study.
The innovative change in our case was somewhat unusual in
that the process was disrupted by the Division's deployment to
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Saudi Arabia. Had the Gulf War not occurred when it did our
case may have been somewhat different. We do not doubt that
Colonel Gerald would have still been successful, the process
would have simply played out differently. A study of a case
of change that was not disrupted by extraordinary
circumstances would be useful.
We also recommend that the Army provide formal instruction
on innovative change for all its officers. This instruction
should be provided at the Combined Arms Services Staff School
and the Command and General Staff College. We hope that
formal instruction in the aspects of innovative change will
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